Implementation with state dependent feasible sets and preferences: a renegotiation approach by Corchón, Luis & Triossi, Matteo
  
Working Paper 05-71 
Economics Series  36 
November 2005 
 
 
Departamento de Economía 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Calle Madrid, 126 
28903 Getafe (Spain) 
Fax (34) 91 624 98 75 
 
 
 
 
IMPLEMENTATION WITH STATE DEPENDENT FEASIBLE SETS AND 
PREFERENCES: A RENEGOTIATION APPROACH∗  
 
Luis C. Corchón1 and Matteo Triosi2 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we present a model of implementation based on the idea that agents renegotiate 
unfeasible allocations. We characterize the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences 
that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium with a class of renegotiation functions that do 
not reward agents for unfeasibilities. This result is used to study the possibility of 
implementing the Walrasian Correspondence in exchange economies and several axiomatic 
solutions to problems of bargaining and bankruptcy.  
 
 
JEL CLASSIFICATION: C72, D60, D78  
 
 
* Acknowledgements.  We thank Carmen Beviá, Roberto Serrano, Asher Wolinski and the 
audiences in the III Workshop of Social Choice, Malaga and the Economic Theory seminar in 
Bilbao for very useful comments. We acknowledge financial support from CAICYT under 
project PB BEC2002-02194 and from Fundación BBVA. 
 
                                                          
1
 Univesidad Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid, 126,  28903 Getafe (Madrid). Departamento de Economía.  
e-mail: lcorchon@eco.uc3m.es  
2
  Univesidad Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid, 126,  28903 Getafe (Madrid). Departamento de Economía.  
e-mail  mtriossi@eco.uc3m.es  
1. Introduction
Since the classic papers of Hurwicz in the early seventies, a great deal of attention has
been devoted to the problem of implementing social choice rules when preferences are
state dependent (see, e.g. Jackson [2000] for a survey). In contrast, very few contribu-
tions have dealt with the problem of implementing social choice rules when the set of
feasible outcomes is state dependent. The problem is that, in this case, some messages
yield unfeasible allocations. Thus, we have to describe how to deal with unfeasible al-
locations. The standard approach is to design a state dependent mechanism in which
the planner can ex-post verify if players are exaggerating endowments or technological
capabilities (i.e. by asking them to put endowments on the table). If infeasibility occurs,
players expect a serious punishment (Hurwicz et al., [1995], Tian [1993], Tian and Li
[1995], Hong [1995], [1996], [1998], Serrano and Vohra [1997] and Dagan et al. [1999]).
We have several reservations about this approach: The assumptions of ex-post ver-
ification of exaggeration only, and a serious punishment if infeasibility arise are rather
extreme. Moreover, it is not clear how to proceed without them. This approach also
produces a curious asymmetry between mechanisms coping with state dependent pref-
erences (“demand”) and mechanisms coping with state dependent endowments (“sup-
ply”). The former are state independent but the latter are state dependent. Finally,
the implementing mechanisms are hard to describe so it may be costly to use them.
In this paper we present a model based on the idea that unfeasible allocations are
renegotiated. We model the social process which transforms unfeasible allocations into
feasible ones by means of a reversion function. This concept originates in Maskin
and Moore (1999) and has been developed by Jackson and Palfrey (2001). In these
papers the reversion function formalized the process of renegotiation by means of which
agents trade goods allocated by the mechanism or veto some feasible allocations. In
our case, the reversion function represents the way in which society reacts to unfeasible
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allocations.1 Consequently, the properties that we impose on the reversion function are
very different from those assumed by the earlier literature.
In this paper we assume complete information. This is a clean scenario which looks
to be a good candidate for a first trial of our ideas. Thus we concentrate on Nash
implementation and assume that agents know the reversion function. Therefore the
reversion function induces new preferences, to be called reverted preferences (this is
the ”translation principle” in Maskin and Moore [1999]). Reverted preferences are
state dependent even if preferences are not. Hence, implementation when the feasible
set is state dependent reduces to the case of implementation when only preferences
are state dependent. However as remarked by Maskin and Moore, ”results from the
standard literature are too abstract to give a clear indication of how serious a constraint
renegotiation is...”.
We focus our attention in a class of reversion function in which, should an infeasi-
bility arise at least one agent is made worse off. We call this a non-rewarding reversion
function. Reversion functions considered before do not fall into this class because they
assume that agents are made better off by renegotiating. The difference is explained by
the fact that in their case, renegotiation comes from the inability of the mechanism to
stop agents from reaching mutually beneficial trades. In our case renegotiation arises
from the physical impossibility of carrying out the intended plans so that somebody has
to make a sacrifice in order to achieve feasibility. An extreme case of a non-rewarding
reversion function is when, should an infeasibility arise, all agents are punished so that
they prefer any allocation without punishment to the situation in which they are pun-
1Renegotiation may be channelled by institutions or may be totally free. A striking example is that
of a legal system. Once infractions are detected there are institutions designed to punish transgressors
and to restore feasibility. In our case we can think of the feasible set including not only the properly
feasible allocations, but also all punishments and additional devices that can be administrated by the
designed institutions, as well as the delays that may occur.
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ished. This strong form of punishment -which we will call generalized severe- resembles
the one implicitly assumed in the previous literature, but in our case it only serves an
instrumental role: we show that in the class of non-rewarding reversion functions, the
generalized severe reversion function implements the largest class of social choice rules
(Proposition 1).
An easy adaptation of the classic result shows that monotonicity, when reverted
preferences are given by the generalized severe reversion function, is a necessary and
almost sufficient condition of implementation in Nash equilibrium (Remark 1). Thus,
our first task is to characterize monotonicity. We show that it is equivalent to a weak
form of unanimity and a generalized form of contraction consistency (Proposition 2).
The former property is satisfied by most social choice rules and the latter is similar to
Nash’s independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Next, we apply the previous result to several frameworks and compare our findings
with the earlier literature. In the case of exchange economies, weak unanimity is trivially
satisfied by any individually rational social choice rule. We show that the Constrained
Walrasian rule satisfies generalized contraction consistency and thus is implementable
(Proposition 3). However the individual rationality requirement which in Hurwicz et
al. (1995) is necessary and sufficient for feasible implementation, is not sufficient for
implementation in our framework. The reason is that they not only assumed that players
never exaggerate their endowments. Since a mechanism is designed for each state of the
world, it is implicitly assumed that players never use messages designed for a different
state of the world even if such messages lead to an outcome which is feasible in the
current state of the world. We turn our attention to bargaining problems. We show
that if the disagreement point is not state dependent the Nash Bargaining solution is
implementable with a non-rewarding reversion function (Proposition 4). This agrees
with the findings of Serrano (1997) and Naeve (1999). We also show that the Kalai-
Smorodinski solution is not implementable. Finally we consider the taxation problem in
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which the mechanism has to collect a given amount of taxes. We find a negative result,
namely that a taxation method is implementable if and only if it is a serial dictatorship,
i.e. agents are arranged so that any agent pays the minimal tax compatible with the
following agents to be able to complete the required amount (Proposition 5). This
negative result contrasts with the permissive results obtained by Dagan et al. (1999).
The difference between our approaches is that in their case the report sent by agents
matters for the renegotiation and in our case it does not. Our result serves to highlight
the negative consequences of disregarding reports (i.e. a fiscal amnesty) even if all agents
show endowments.
The rest of the paper goes as follows: Section 2 spells out the model. Section
3 introduces reversion functions. Sections 4 and 5 study implementation under the
assumption that the reversion function is non rewarding. Section 6 concludes.
2. The model
In this section we provide the main definitions. Let us first describe the environment.
Let I = {1, ..., n} be the set of agents. Let ωi be type of i and Ωi be agent i’s type
set. Let Ω ⊂
Qn
i=1Ωi be the set of all possible states of the world. Each ω ∈ Ω is char-
acterized by a list of individual outcome sets (X1(ω), ...,Xn(ω)), a feasible set A(ω) ⊂Qn
i=1Xi(ω) ≡ X(ω) and a preference profile R(ω) = (R1(ω), ..., Rn(ω)). The outcome
set of i might include sanctions that can be charged to i and other constraints such as
individual rationality, etc. A(ω) contains all feasible allocations including punishments
that arise in state ω. Set A ≡
S
ω∈ΩA(ω). Let a = (a1, ..., an) ∈ A be an allocation also
written (ai, a−i). Let Ai(ω) = {ai ∈ Xi(ω) : ∃ a−i such that (ai, a−i) ∈ A(ω)} be agent
i’s feasibility constraint. Observe that A(ω) can be written too as
Tn
i=1 {a : ai ∈ Ai(ω)}.
Ri(ω) is a preference relation, a complete, reflexive and transitive binary relation on
X(ω). Pi(ω) denotes the corresponding strict preference relation. Let Li(a, ω) = {x ∈
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A(ω) : aRi(ω)x} be agent i’s lower contour set of ai. Let <i ≡ ∪ωi∈ΩiRi(ωi) be the set
of i’s admissible preferences relations. Set < = Qni=1<i. With abuse of notation, for
every profile of preferences R ∈ < we will also denote by R the preference profile that
R induces on A.
A correspondence F : Ω ³ A such that F (ω) ⊂ A(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω will be called a
Social Choice Rule (SCR for brevity).
Amechanism is a pair (M,g) whereM ≡
Qn
1 Mi is themessage space and g :M → A
is the outcome function. Mi denotes agent i’s message space. Letm = (m1, ..,mn) ∈M ,
be a list of messages also written (mi,m−i). Given ω ∈ Ω, a mechanism (M,g) induces
a game (M,g,R(ω)).
A message profile m∗ ∈ M is a Nash equilibrium for (M,g,R(ω)) if, for all i ∈ I
g(m∗)Ri(ω)g(m∗−i,mi) for all mi ∈Mi.
NE(M,g,R(ω)) will denote the set of allocations that are yielded by all Nash equi-
libria for (M,g,R(ω)).
The mechanism (M,g) implements F in Nash equilibrium if, for all ω ∈ΩNE(M,g,R(ω)) =
F (ω).
3. Reversion functions
Since outcomes that are feasible in some states may be unfeasible in others, we have to
describe how society deals with unfeasible allocations. We assume that if an allocation
is unfeasible it is transformed into a feasible one by a process that might involve delays
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(because renegotiation takes time), penalties to some individuals, etc. This systematic
way in which the reallocation process takes place will be called a reversion function.2
This reallocation may correspond to a “free-market renegotiation” or to a process where
the planner applies some kind of punishment or a bankruptcy rule. Formally:
Definition 1. A reversion function is a map h : A×Ω→ A such that for each ω ∈ Ω,
i) h(a, ω) ∈ A(ω) ∀a ∈ A and ii) If a ∈ A(ω), h(a, ω) = a.
A reversion function always yields feasible allocations (condition i) above) and is
such that feasible allocations are not renegotiated (condition ii) above). The latter
condition is made in order to separate the issue of infeasibility from the issue of pure
renegotiation.3
If the reversion function can be chosen by the planner, under weak conditions, any
single valued SCR can be implemented as the next example shows.
Example 1. Assume that there is a state of the world, say ω0, in which the feasible
set is larger than in any other state, i.e. A(ω) ⊂ A(ω0), any ω 6= ω0. Then, any
single-valued SCR such that F (ω0) ∈ A(ω0) \ S
ω0 6=ω
A(ω) can be implemented for some
reversion function: Take a constant mechanism g(m) = F (ω0), ∀m ∈M and a reversion
function h(F (ω0), ω) ≡ F (ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω. h fulfils the conditions for a reversion function
since F (ω0) is unfeasible at any state different than ω0 and by definition it provides the
desired allocations. Notice that implementation occurs in dominant strategies.
This example implies that in order to obtain meaningful results it is better not to
allow the designer of the mechanism to also design the reversion function. This is also
intuitively agreeable because it seems reasonable that there are aspects of renegotiation
2See Amorós (2004) for a model with several renegotiation functions.
3A tautological interpretation of the latter condition is that A(ω) is the set of allocations that are
not renegotiated at ω.
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that are beyond the control of the designer. Thus, in the rest of the paper we will
assume that the reversion function is exogenously given.
To explain the next step, consider the simplest possible case: At states of the world
ω and ω0 the preference profile, say R, is the same. Let a, b and c be three allocations
that are feasible at state ω. Assume that aPibPic for some agent i. In state ω0, a is not
feasible and is renegotiated to c and b is feasible. So, even if the underlying preferences
are the same in both states, player i prefers a to b at state ω and b to a at ω0. To
formalize and extend this idea we give the following definition.
Definition 2. Given ω ∈ Ω and a reversion function h, the reversion of R(ω) on A(ω),
denoted by Rh(ω) is
aRhi (ω)b⇔ h(a, ω)Ri(ω)h(b, ω), ∀ a, b ∈ A, i ∈ I.
Lhi (a, ω) = {b ∈ A : h(a, ω)Ri(ω)h(b, ω)} will be called the lower contour set of a at ω
with respect to Rh(ω).
Then, when the reversion function is h, we can interpret that agents’ preferences
are the reverted preferences, i.e. they only care about reverted allocations. The next
definition is a straightforward adaptation of the standard notion of implementation in
Nash equilibrium.
Definition 3. A social choice rule F is h-implementable in Nash Equilibrium if there
exists a game form (M,g) such that for all ω ∈ Ω
F (ω) = h(NE(M,g,Rh(ω)))
In words, F is h-implementable in Nash equilibrium if and only if it is implementable
in Nash equilibrium when for each ω ∈ Ω the correspondent preference profile is Rh(ω).
In other words, once we consider that agents’ preferences are those induced by the
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reversion function, we can deal with h-implementation exactly in the same way as done
in the classical implementation problem.
In the study of the restrictions that a state dependent feasible set imposes on im-
plementation, we concentrate on monotonicity (or Maskin-monotonicity). As observed
by Jackson (2001), monotonicity is the most important obstacle to implementation in
Nash equilibrium. For instance, it is not generally satisfied by the Walrasian social
choice rule. Monotonicity is a necessary and almost sufficient condition for a SCR to
be implementable in Nash equilibrium (see Maskin (1999) or Repullo (1987)). Thus it
is the first condition to deal with.
A SCR satisfies monotonicity whenever an alternative is chosen at a state of the
world and it rises in each agent’s preference ranking at another state of the world, then
it must be chosen also at this state. Now we restate the definition of monotonicity in
terms of reverted preferences. Let h be a reversion function.
Definition 4. A social choice rule F is h-monotonic if for any ω, ω0 ∈ Ω and a such
that h(a, ω) ∈ F (ω) such that Lhi (a, ω) ⊂ Lhi (a, ω0) for all agents i then h(a, ω0) ∈ F (ω0).
The importance of h-monotonicity is highlighted by the following remark whose proof
is a straightforward adaptation of an standard result mentioned before and, therefore,
is omitted:
Remark 1. If a social choice rule is h-implementable in Nash equilibrium, it is h-
monotonic. Moreover in economic environments with #I > 2 if a social choice rule is
h-monotonic, it is h-implementable in Nash equilibrium.4
4An economic environment is one in which no two agents agree on the top allocation of their preference
rankings.
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4. Non-Rewarding Reversion Functions: Basic Results
In this section, we restrict our attention to a class of reversion functions where renego-
tiation is not advantageous for all players. We will call them Non-Rewarding. We will
show that inside this class a particular reversion function -that we will call Generalized
Severe- implements the maximal set of SCR. Then, we will characterize the SCR that
can be implemented under generalized severe reversion functions.
Let us start by defining the following class of reversion functions:
Definition 5. A reversion function is non-rewarding if for a ∈ A(ω) either there exists
i ∈ I and c ∈ A(ω0) such that aRi(ω)h(c, ω) with cPi(ω0)h(a, ω0) or Lhj (a, ω) ⊂ Lhj (a, ω0)
for all j.
Consider the case where the feasible set is constant and only preferences change.
In this case the first condition in the definition postulates the existence of a pair of
allocations for which there is a preference reversal.5 In the case where preferences are
fixed and the feasible set varies, the idea is that when agents renegotiate, something bad
happens -delays, punishments engineered from the designer, etc.- and this is what causes
the inversion of the ranking of a and c in the reverted preferences. The second condition
in the definition considers the case where a has improved in everybody´s ranking when
passing from ω to ω0. It takes care of the case where A(ω0) ⊂ A(ω) because if a ∈ A(ω0)
no feasible reversal around a can take place.
Consider now a specific reversion function which belongs to the class of non-rewarding
ones. Suppose that, should an infeasibility arise, players are redirected to what they
consider to be the worst possible allocation. This reversion function resembles the
assumption made in previous papers that agents do not choose unfeasible messages be-
cause the planner detects infeasibility and imposes a punishment in such a way that
5This condition was emphsized by Maskin and Moore (1991): ”The other problem that renegotiation
poses is that it interferes with ”preference reversal”.
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agents prefer any other feasible allocation to this punishment. However our interest in
this particular reversion function arises from the fact that it allows finding the maximal
set of SCR that can be implemented under non-rewarding renegotiation (see Proposition
1 below).
Let G ∈ A(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω be such that for all i, aPi(ω)G with a 6= G and a ∈ A(ω). G
will be called the “generalized punishment point”. The reversion function with h(a, ω) =
G if a /∈ A(ω) will be called generalized severe and the induced preferences Rh(ω) will
be called the saturation of R(ω) on A(ω) defined by the following properties.
For all i ∈ I:
(1) If a, b ∈ A(ω) then aRhi (ω)b if and only if aRi(ω)b
(2) If a ∈ A(ω) and b /∈ A(ω) then aP hi (ω)b
(3) If a, b /∈ A(ω) then aIhi (ω)b
We show that generalized severe reversion implements the largest set of social choice
rules among the class of non-rewarding reversion functions.
Proposition 1. Let F be a SCR which is h−implementable in Nash Equilibrium with
a non rewarding reversion function. Then F is implementable in Nash Equilibrium with
a generalized severe reversion function.
Proof Let (M,g) implementing F with reversion function h.
Let a ∈ F (ω). Let m(ω, a) be a Nash equilibrium of
©
M,g;Rh(ω)
ª
such that
g(m(ω, a)) = a.
Let Bi(ω, a) = g(Mi × {m−i(ω, a)}) be the attainable set of i.
Set Bhi (ω, a) =
S
ω0∈Ω{c ∈ A(ω0) : aRi(ω)h(c, ω), cPi(ω0)h(a, ω0) if for some b ∈
Bi(ω, a), aRi(ω)h(b, ω), h(b, ω0)Pi(ω0)h(a, ω0)}
Set Bh = Im g ∪ (
S
ω,ω0∈Ω
i∈I
{c ∈ A(ω0) : aRi(ω)h(c, ω), aPi(ω0)h(c, ω0) if for some
b ∈ Bi(ω, a), aRi(ω)h(b, ω), h(b, ω0)Pi(ω0)h(a, ω0)}).
Observe that for all ω ∈ Ω, a ∈ F (ω), and i, Bhi (ω, a) ⊂ Bh. Thus:
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-Bhi (ω, a) ∩A(ω) ⊂ Bi(ω, a) ∩A(ω) for all ω
-aRhi (ω)x for all x ∈ Bi(ω, a) and for all i ∈ I
-if aRi(ω0)x for all i ∈ I , x ∈ Bhi (ω, a) ∩ A(ω0) then a ∈ F (ω0). Otherwise there
would exist j ∈ I and b ∈ Bj(ω, a) such that h(b, ω0)Pi(ω0)h(a, ω0). h is non-
rewarding so there exists c ∈ A(ω0) such that aRj(ω)h(c, ω), cPj(ω0)h(a, ω0). By
definition c belongs to Bhj (ω, a).
Using the assumption that h is non-rewarding we can prove, exactly as above:
-if b ∈ Bhi (ω, a) for some i ∈ I is such that for some ω0 ∈ Ω, bRi(ω0)x for all
x ∈ Bhi (ω, a) ∩ A(ω0), and if bRhj (ω0)x for all x ∈ Bh ∩ A(ω0) for each j 6= i then
b ∈ F (ω0).
-if b ∈ Bh is such that for some ω0 ∈ Ω, bRhi (ω0)x ∀ x ∈ B for all i, then b ∈ F (ω0)
For all i set M 0i = {(ω, a); a ∈ F (ω)} × Bh ×N, where N is the set of integers.
Let M 0 =
QN
1 M
0
i , and g
0 :M 0 −→ A such that:
a) g0(m) = a if mi = (ω, a, b, n) ∀i.
b) If there exists a unique i such that for all j 6= i mj = (ω, a, b, n) and mi =
(ωi, ai, bi, ni) is such that (ω, a, b, n) 6= (ωi, ai, bi, ni) then set g0(m) = b if bi ∈
Bhi (ω, a), otherwise set g
0(m) = a.
c) Otherwise set g0(m) = bi where i = min argmaxj{nj ;mj = (ωj , aj , bj , nj)}.
This is the canonical mechanism in Nash implementation. It is proved immediately
that(M 0, g0) implements F by generalized severe punishment.
In words, generalized severe reversion implements any SCR implementable with non-
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rewarding reversion functions.6 , 7 The rest of this section will be devoted to study the
former. According to Remark 1 this leads us to study h-monotonicity under saturated
preferences.
We now introduce two properties that are necessary and sufficient for h-monotonicity
under generalized severe reversion.
Definition 6. A SCR F satisfies Weak Unanimity (WU) if for all ω,ω0 ∈ Ω such that
A(ω0) ⊂ A(ω) and for all a ∈ A(ω)\A(ω0) such that Li(a, ω) ∩A(ω0) ⊂ Li(a, ω0) for all
i ∈ I, a /∈ F (ω).
When preferences are fixed, WU says that if all alternatives available at ω0 are also
available at ω, the SCR will not select at ω an alternative which is available at ω but
not at ω0 if all players prefer any allocation available at ω0 to it. If this condition is
not satisfied, when the actual state is ω all agents have incentives to underrepresent
the economy and implement the decision intended for state ω0. Notice that WU is
equivalent to the following condition: if A(ω0) ⊂ A(ω) and a ∈ F (ω)\A(ω0) then there
exists b ∈ A(ω0), b 6= G such that aRib for some i ∈ I.
6Proposition 1 can be proved under the following assumption that generalizes that of a non-rewarding
reversion function: whenever there exists i ∈ I with aRi(ω)h(b, ω) and h(b, ω0)Pi(ω0)h(a, ω0) a ∈ A(ω)
then there exists j and c ∈ A(ω0) such that: i) aRj(ω)h(b, ω) and h(b, ω0)Pj(ω0)h(a, ω0) and ii)
aRj(ω)h(c, ω) with cPj(ω0)h(a, ω0). This says that at least one agent suffers as a consequence of unfea-
sibility in a way that could have been done through a feasible allocation. For instance, the agent who is
deemed responsible for the unfeasibility is punished and there is an agent who does not get the bundle
she consumed at the other state.
7The assumption of non rewarding is necessary for Proposition 1 to hold. Let Ω = {ω, ω0}, A(ω) =
{a, b, c,G} and A(ω0) = {a, b,G}. Let n = 2 and Ri(ω) = Ri(ω0) = R for i = 1, 2 where bPaPc. Let
F (ω) = a and F (ω0) = b. Let h(c, ω0) = b. h does not satisfy the non rewarding assumption at c. F is
h-implementable in NE by the simple mechanism which leaves agent 1 to choose among a and c. But it
cannot be implemented by severe generalized punishment because F ( ) is not monotonic with respect
to saturated preferences.
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Definition 7. A SCR F satisfies Generalized Contraction Consistency (GCC) if, for
ω, ω0 ∈ Ω, and for a ∈ F (ω) ∩A(ω0) such that Li(a, ω) ∩A(ω) ∩A(ω0) ⊂ Li(a, ω0) and
A(ω0)\A(ω) ⊂ Li(a, ω0).for all i ∈ I, a ∈ F (ω0).
When preferences are fixed and A(ω0) ⊂ A(ω), A(ω0)\A(ω) = ∅ ⊂ Li(a, ω) for all i.
In such a case GCC prescribes choosing at state ω0 any feasible allocation we have chosen
at ω. Thus GCC is a weak version of Nash Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (see
Roemer [1996], p. 55). In the general case, GCC says that if a is selected at state ω,
is feasible at ω0 and no better alternatives are available in A(ω0)\A(ω), then a must be
selected also at ω0.
Proposition 2. A SCR is h-monotonic under generalized severe punishment if and
only if it satisfies Generalized Contraction Consistency and Weak Unanimity.
Proof Let h denote the generalized severe punishment reversion function.
We begin by proving the necessity of WU and GCC. Let F be h-monotonic.
Then F must satisfy WU. Let ω,ω0 ∈ Ω, let A(ω0) ⊂ A(ω) and let a ∈ A(ω)\A(ω0)
such that Li(a, ω) ∩ A(ω0) ⊂ Li(a, ω0) and i ∈ I. By contradiction, let a ∈ F (ω).
Then Lhi (a, ω) = (Li(a, ω) ∩A(ω)) ∪A\A(ω) = (Li(a, ω) ∩A(ω0))∪
(Li(a, ω)∩A(ω)\A(ω0))∪A\A(ω) ⊂ (Li(a, ω0)∩A(ω0))∪A\A(ω0) = Lhi (a, ω0) for
all i ∈ I. Then h-monotonicity implies that a ∈ F (ω0), which is a contradiction
as F (ω0) ⊂ A(ω0).
Now we consider GCC. Let a ∈ F (ω)∩A(ω0) such that Li(a, ω)∩A(ω)∩A(ω0) ⊂
Li(a, ω0) and A(ω0)\A(ω) ⊂ Li(a, ω0) for all i ∈ I.
Lhi (a, ω) = (Li(a, ω) ∩A(ω) ∩A(ω0)) ∪ (Li(a, ω) ∩A(ω)\A(ω0))∪
(A(ω0)\A(ω)) ∪ ((A\A(ω))\A(ω0)) ⊂ (Li(a, ω0) ∩A(ω) ∩A(ω0))∪
(Li(a, ω0) ∩A(ω0)) ∪A\A(ω0) = Lhi (a, ω0). h-monotonicity implies a ∈ F (ω0).
We next show the sufficiency of WU and GCC for F to be h-monotonic.
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Let ω, ω0 ∈ Ω, and let a ∈ F (ω) such that Lhi (a, ω) ⊂ Lhi (a, ω0) for all i. Consider
the following three cases.
i) A(ω) ∩A(ω0) = {G}
ii) A(ω) ∩A(ω0) 6= {G} and a /∈ A(ω0)
iii) A(ω) ∩A(ω0) 6= {G} and a ∈ A(ω0)
i) It is not possible. In such a case there is no i ∈ I Lhi (a, ω) ⊂ Lhi (a, ω0), since,
from the definition of saturated preferences it follows that aP hi (ω)b and bP
h
i (ω
0)a
for all b ∈ A(ω0).
ii) It must be the case that A(ω0) ⊂ A(ω). Otherwise from the definition of
saturated preferences for all b ∈ A(ω0)\A(ω): aP hi (ω)b and bPhi (ω0)a for all i.
Then we must have Li(a, ω) ∩ A(ω0) ⊂ Li(a, ω0) for all i ∈ I Otherwise for some
i ∈ I,. b ∈ A(ω0): aRi(ω)b and bPi(ω0)a. But from WU it would follow that
a /∈ F (ω), a contradiction.
iii) It must be the case that Li(a, ω) ∩A(ω) ∩A(ω0) ⊂ Li(a, ω0) and
A(ω0)\A(ω) ⊂ Li(a, ω0) for all i ∈ I. Otherwise either there exists b ∈ A(ω) ∩A(ω0)
such that aRi(ω)b and bPi(ω0)a for some i ∈ I, or there exists b ∈ A(ω0)\A(ω) such that
aP hi (ω)b and bPi(ω
0)a for some i ∈ I. Then GCC implies that a ∈ F (ω0).
So F is monotonic. .
5. Non-Rewarding Reversion Functions: Applications
In this section we apply the findings of previous sections to exchange economies and to
bargaining and bankruptcy problems.
5.1. Exchange Economies: Withholding
First, we notice that in this environment with more than two agents, h-monotonicity is
necessary and sufficient for F to be h-implementable in Nash equilibrium.
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There are n agents and K goods. Let Xi = RK+ be i’s consumption set. We assume
that agents’ preferences and consumption sets do not vary but endowments do. Let
ui be a utility function that represents agent i’s preferences. Let Ωi ⊂ RK+ be the
set of agent i’s possible endowments. For ω = (ω1, ..., ωn) ∈ Ω set ω =
Pn
i=1 ωi. We
consider that the planner can only transfer goods among players. Then the allocation
set contains the set of the balanced net transfers and the generalized punishment point,
A = {x ∈ RK×n :PKs=1 xs = 0}∪{G}. For all ω ∈ Ω the feasible set is A(ω) = {x ∈ A :
xi + ωi ≥ 0 for i = 1, ..., n} ∪ {G}. Then A(ω0) ⊂ A(ω) if and only if ω0 ≤ ω. In
order to describe preferences on net transfers, notice that the utility agent i gets from
transfer xi when her endowment is ωi is ui(xi + ωi). Thus, the utility function is state
dependent even if preferences are not. For each ω and for all x ∈ A(ω) for all i set
ui(x, ω) ≡ ui(xi + ωi).
Saturated preferences can be represented by the following utility functions:
uωi (x) = ui(x, ω) x ∈ A(ω)\ {G}
uωi (G) = ui(0)− ε, ε > 0.
Let us first consider WU. It is easily seen that it suffices to consider only endowments
ω, ω0 such that ω0 ≤ ω. Then WU amounts to the following condition:
Condition α : For all ω, ω0 ∈ Ω such that ω0 ≤ ω, if a ∈ F (ω)\A(ω0) there exists i
such that ui(ωi + ai) ≥ ui(ωi − ω0i).
Observe that if (0, ωi) ⊂ Ωi for all i then Condition α requires simply the SCR to
be individually rational for at least one agent. It is a very weak requirement and it is
obviously satisfied by many SCR, e.g., any Pareto efficient or any individually rational
SCR.
Stronger requirements are imposed by GCC. Also in this case, it suffices to consider
only endowments ω, ω0 ∈ Ω such that ω0 ≤ ω. GCC is satisfied if and only if the
following condition holds:
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Condition β. For all ω, ω0 ∈ Ω such that ω0 ≤ ω, if a ∈ F (ω)∩A(ω0) and a /∈ F (ω0)
there exists i and x ∈ A(ω0) such that
ui (ωi + ai) ≥ ui (ωi + xi)
ui
¡
ω0i + ai
¢
< ui
¡
ω0i + xi
¢
Let us compare our conditions with Hong (1998). She showed that a SCR is imple-
mentable by a collection of state dependent mechanisms if and only if the following
condition is satisfied
ui(ωi + fi(ω)) ≥ ui(ωi − ω0i) for all i (H)
Our Condition (α) is weaker than condition (H): If x ∈ A(ω0) then ui(ωi+xi) ≥ ui(ωi−
ω0i) for all i as all ui are increasing. Then if f(ω) ∈ A(ω0), ui(ωi + fi(ω)) ≥ ui(ωi − ω0i)
for all i. So for ω,ω0 with f(ω) ∈ A(ω0) condition (H) holds. Notice that our condition
depends on the fact that each agent cannot simply retain part of her endowment, but
she has to make it compatible with other agents’ messages. But our Condition (β) is
not implied by Condition (H). Assume for instance that f(ω) ∈ A(ω0) then (H) imposes
no restrictions on f(ω0). If the translations by ω − ω0 of all agents’ indifference curves
through ω0+f(ω) are strictly above all agents’ indifferences curves through ω+f(ω), then
condition (β) implies f(ω) = f(ω0). Formally if for all y ∈ {y : ui(ω0i + fi(ω))) = ui(yi)
for all i} we have ui(yi + ωi − ω0i) > ui(ωi + fi(ω)) for all i, condition (β) imposes that
f(ω) = f(ω0).
The difference between our conditions and Hong’s is explained by the fact that her goal
is to design one feasible mechanism (M(ω), g(ω)) for each possible endowments ω, in
a way such that the larger the feasible set, the larger the message space. Two of her
assumptions make our approaches different:
i) Hong assumes that players can not exaggerate their endowment and that they can be
punished by the message they send, not only for the allocation they intend to obtain, if
such an allocation is not feasible.
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ii) Hong gives each player the power of retaining part of her endowments. In our frame-
work we assume that players can collectively cheat the planner through the mechanism
by asking for a feasible allocation in which some agents retain a part of their endowment.
Finally, let us analyze the implementation of the Constrained Walrasian SCR. a is
a Constrained Walrasian Allocation (CWA) at ω iff there exists p ∈ RK+ such that ∀
i = 1, ..., n, a ∈ argmax {ui(ωi + xi) : pxi ≤ 0, x ∈ A(ω)}. p is said to be an equilibrium
price supporting a at ω. Let CW (ω) denote the set of CWA at ω.
Proposition 3. Let utility functions be increasing, continuous and quasi-concave. Let
Ωi = (0, ωi) for all i for some ωi ∈ (0,∞). Then the Constrained Walrasian SCR is
implementable in Nash Equilibrium by generalized severe punishment.
Proof Under our assumptions CW (ω) is not empty for all ω ∈ Ω. To prove the claim
it suffices to show that CW satisfies Condition β. Let ω0 ≤ ω, a ∈ CW (ω) ∩
A(ω0) and a /∈ CW (ω0). Let p an equilibrium price at ω. Then there exists
x ∈ A(ω0) with ui(ω0 + xi) > ui(ω0 + ai) and pxi ≤ 0 some i. A(ω0) ⊂ A(ω)
so x ∈ {pxi ≤ 0, x ∈ A(ω)} . From the definition of CW it follows ui (ωi + ai) ≥
ui (ωi + xi). Then CW satisfies Condition β.8
5.2. Bargaining with unknown utility possibility set
We now consider the non-cooperative implementation of cooperative solution concepts
(Dagan and Serrano [1998] and Naeve [1999]).
A bargaining problem is a pair (U, v) where U ⊂ Rn+ is the utility possibility set and
v ∈ U is the disagreement point. We assume that U is convex, closed, with a non empty
8The Walrasian Correspondence WC defined by WC(ω) = argmax {ui(ωi + xi) : pxi ≤ 0} is not
implementable in Nash Equilibrium by generalized severe punishment. An example is available from
the authors under request but intuitively it is clear that in our case preferences vary, so we are back to
the classical framework where such a problem is well known.
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interior and comprehensive (i.e. u ∈ U and u0 ≤ u, u0 ∈ Rn+ implies u0 ∈ U). For each
bargaining problem, (U, v) let Uv = {u ∈ U : u ≥ v} be bounded. The Nash Bargaining
Solution (NBS) is defined as NBS(U, v) = argmaxu∈Uv
Qn
i=1(ui − vi). It is completely
characterized by the following properties: strong efficiency, individual rationality, scale
covariance, symmetry and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Let NBS(U, v)i be
the utility received by i.
We consider here non rewarding reversion function more suited to the situation. We
say that a reversion function is Not Severe if for all a ∈ A and ω ∈ Ω h(a, ω) 6= G.
We consider Uv as the feasible set of (U, v) and we assume that unfeasible allocations
are renegotiated into the disagreement point. Let h to denote such reversion function.
Clearly h is Non Rewarding. Agent i’s reverted preferences at (U, v) are described by
uhi (u(U, v))) = ui if u ∈ Uv
uhi (u(U, v)) = vi otherwise.
If the disagreement point is not known by the planner, NBS fails to satisfy GCC:
Let n = 2 and let U =
©
x ∈ R2+ : x21 + x22 ≤ 1
ª
. Let v = (0, 0) and let v0 =
³
(12)
1
2 , 0
´
.
Then NBS(U, v) =
³¡
1
2
¢ 1
2 ,
¡
1
2
¢ 1
2
´
∈ Uv0 ⊂ Uv but NBS(U, v) 6= NBS(U, v0). Thus,
according to Proposition 1, NBS is not implementable in NE by any non-rewarding
reversion function.9
The Kalai-Smorodinski solution does not satisfy GCC even with fixed disagreement
point. Then Proposition 1 implies that it cannot be implemented in NE by any non
rewarding reversion function.10
Instead, when the disagreement point is known, the NBS satisfies both GCC andWU
as the reader can easily check. However, Proposition 2 cannot be used to conclude that
9This result agrees with the findings of Serrano (1997).
10A different interpretation of preferences on the utility possibility set may lead to more permissive
results. One can interpret them as if they were a measure of agents’ satisfaction with respect to the
disagreement point. A representation consistent with this view is ui(u, (U, v)) = ui − vi. Then the
19
the NBS is implementable by generalized severe punishment because Maskin Theorem
requires at least three agents (see Remark 1).11
We prove the result directly by using the characterizations by Moore and Repullo
(1990).
Proposition 4. Let n ≥ 2. The Nash Bargaining Solution is h-implementable in Nash
Equilibrium with a Non-Severe h if the disagreement point v is known.
Proof Let x = NBS(U, v). Let i ∈ I and let (U 0, v) be a bargaining problem. Let
u ∈ Lhi (x, (U, v)) such that, at (U 0, v) and with reverted preferences u is maximal
for i in Lhi (x, (U
0, v)) and u is maximal in Rn+ for all agents different from i.
We first prove that u = NBS(U 0, v). Observe that it must be the case that u
is feasible at U 0 otherwise all agents different from i would prefer some point in
the interior of U 0v and that uj = max
n
u0j : u0 = (u0j , u0−j) ∈ U 0v
o
for all j 6= i. In
particular u lies on the boundary of U 0. If u 6= NBS(U 0, v) then NBS(U 0, v)i >
ui. If NBS(U 0, v) /∈ Uv u is not maximal in Lhi (x, (U, v)) for i when preference
are reverted at (U 0, v), a contradiction. Finally consider the case NBS(U 0, v) ∈
preferences that h induces in this case are
uhi (u, (U, v)) = ui − vi if u ∈ Uv
uhi (u, (U, v)) = 0 otherwise
Observe that uhi (u, (U, v)) = uhi (u−v, (U −v, 0)). The reader can easily check that from the translation
invariance property of the NBS the analysis of the problem with unknown endowments amounts to the
previous situation with the endowment fixed and known at 0. In this case applying Proposition 4 below
yields a positive result.
11NBS does not satisfy no-veto power either. Let v = (0, 0, 0) and U =©
x ∈ R3+ : max {x1, x2} ≤ 1,max {x1 + x3, x2 + x3} ≤ 1
ª
. Agent 1 and agent 2 prefer u = (1, 1, 0) ∈ U
to any other allocation, under saturated preferences but NBS(U, v) = ( 23 ,
2
3 ,
1
3 ).
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Uv. NBS(U 0, v) 6= NBS(U, v) and NBS (U, v) /∈ U 0v0 otherwise u would not be
maximal in Lhi (x, (U, v)) for i under reverted preferences. Consider the segment
joining NBS(U 0, v) and u. Such a segment lies in U 0v because U 0v is convex and it
intersects {u0 ∈ Uv : NBS(U, v)i ≥ u0i } because Uv is convex and NBS (U, v) /∈
U 0v. All along the segment the coordinate i increases from u0i to NBS(U
0, v)i. Then
there exists a point in {u0 ∈ Uv : NBS(U, v)i ≥ u0i } which has the i-th coordinate
strictly greater than ui, a contradiction. Let u be maximal in Rn+ for all agents
when preferences reverted at (U 0, v) then uj = max
n
u0j : u
0 = (u0j , u
0
−j) ∈ U 0v
o
for
all j. From efficiency it follows that u = NBS(U 0, v).
NBS satisfies Individual Rationality, Pareto efficiency and GCC, too. Then, when
n ≥ 3 the family of sets
©
Lh(x, (U, v))
ª
x=NBS(U,v) satisfies condition μ in Moore
and Repullo (1990). When n = 2 it satisfies condition μ1 in the same paper,
because of the disagreement point. Then the application of Theorems 1 and 2
there, respectively leads to the claim.
5.3. Taxation
A taxation problem, is a pair (x, T ) ∈ Rn+ × R+ where x is the vector of taxable in-
comes and T is the total amount to be collected such that
Pn
i=1 xi ≥ T (Dagan
et alia [1999]). A tax allocation t is a vector of Rn+ and it is feasible for the tax-
ation problem (x, T ) if t ≤ x and
Pn
i=1 ti = T . A taxation method is a function
f which associates a tax allocation to each taxation problem. We assume that the
planner knows the amount to be collected, T , but she does not know the taxable vec-
tor x. Let Sn(T ) =
©
t ∈ Rn+ :
Pn
i=1 ti = T
ª
be the set of tax allocations that collect
T . Let Ωn(T ) =
©
x ∈ Rn+ :
Pn
i=1 xi ≥ T
ª
be the set of the states of the world. Let
Tn(x) = Tn(x, T ) =
©
t ∈ Rn+ : 0 ≤ t ≤ x,
Pn
i=1 ti = T
ª
be the set of feasible tax al-
locations at x. Each agent’s preferences only depend on her after tax income and are
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strictly increasing. Then we can assume ui(t, x) = xi−ti for each x ∈ Ωn(T ) and for each
t ∈ Tn(x, T ). Assume that only income exaggeration can be detected and punished.
The reversion function is non rewarding. Therefore, the hypothesis of Proposition 1 are
fulfilled.
Let σ : I → I be a permutation or ranking on the agents. Set (i) = σ−1(i). Let f (σ)
be the following feasible taxation method.
fσ(1)(x) = min
©
t(1) : t ∈ Tn(x, T )
ª
fσ(j)(x) = min
(
t(j) : t ∈ Tn−j+1(x−{(1),...,(j−1)}, T −
j−1X
i=1
fσ(n−i)(x))
)
j = 1, .., n
The first agent (1) pays her last feasible amount. The second agent pays her last
feasible amount given (1) payment and so on. Each agent is a dictator with respect to
the following players. For this reason fσ will be called the σ-serial dictatorship.12
An equivalent definition for fσ is
fσ(n)(x) = min
©
x(n), T
ª
fσ(n−j)(x) = min
(
x(n−j), T −
n−j+1X
i=n
fσ(n−i)(x)
)
j = 1, .., n− 1
In words, player n pays the whole amount to be collected if she has enough income.
Otherwise what is left is paid by player n− 1 if she has enough income and so on.
Proposition 5. Let h be a non rewarding reversion function and let f be a continuous
feasible taxation method. If f is h−implementable in Nash Equilibrium then it is a
serial dictatorship. If f is a serial dictatorship then it is h-implementable for any non
rewarding h.
12Serial dictatorship plays an important part in the characterization of SCF truthfully implementable
in Dominant Strategies (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein [1981]) and in the equilibrium in social systems
in which property rights are weakly protected (Piccione and Rubinstein [1993]).
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Proof For each x and t ∈ Tn(x) set I(t, x) = {y : t ≤ y ≤ x}. We first prove that
f((I(f(x), x)) = {f(x)} for all x. In particular, if I(f(x), x) ∩ I(f(x0), x0) 6= ∅,
then f(x) = f(x0). Let x0 ≤ x. In such a case T (x0) ⊂ T (x). Let t = f(x) ∈ T (x0),
which is f(x) ≤ x0 then Li(t, x)∩T (x)∩T (x0) ⊂ Li(t, x0). If x0 ≤ x and f(x) ≤ x0
then GCC prescribes that f(x0) = f(x). In particular f(x) = f(y) for all y such
that f(x) ≤ y ≤ x.
By contradiction let f be not a serial dictatorship. Then exist x,i, j such that
0 < fi(x) < xi and 0 < fj(x) < xj . Then I(f(x), x) is at least 2 dimensional.
Let y ≥ x. We show that f(y) = f(x). On the contrary assume f(y) 6= f(x).
There is no loss of generality in assuming that f(z) 6= f(x) for all z on the segment
joining y and x. Otherwise, by continuity, we can substitute x with the point x0,
on the segment, having the largest coordinates. From the observation above it
follows that for all such z, f(z) /∈ T (x). Let z → x on this segment then. By
continuity f(z)→ f(x). If f(z) converges then f(z)→ t∗, where t∗i = 0 or t∗j = 0.
Let x∗ = (T, ..., T ). It follows that f(y) = f(x) for all y ≥ f(x). If y ¤ f(x) then
f(y) = fσ(y) for some σ, because otherwise I(f(y), y) ∩ I(f(x∗), x∗) 6= ∅ and
f(x∗) = f(x) is not feasible at y. But in such a case f would not be continuous.
A contradiction.
The proof of the second part of the claim is as in Proposition 4.
We end this section by noting that there are also discontinuous feasible taxation
methods that are h−implementable in Nash equilibrium as the proof of the previous
result suggests. Let x∗ = (T, ..., T ), let t ∈ Ω(T ) and let σ be a permutation on I.
f(x) = (
T
n
, ...,
T
n
) for all x ≥ (T
n
, ...,
T
n
)
f(x) = fσ(x) otherwise
It is not difficult to prove that f is implementable in NE through generalized severe
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punishment.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a new approach to deal with the implementation problem
when feasible sets are state dependent. It is based on the idea that agents renegotiate
unfeasible allocations into feasible ones. We have presented a class of reversion functions
that are suited to our problem and we have found necessary and sufficient conditions
for implementation when renegotiation takes this form. Finally we have used our char-
acterization results to study the implementation in Nash equilibrium of social choice
rules in exchange economies, bargaining problems and taxation methods, and we have
compared our results with those obtained by the earlier literature.
A feature of the traditional approach of implementation when feasible sets are state
dependent is that it requires a collection of state dependent mechanisms, contrary to
the case when preferences are state dependent. This distinction contrast vividly with
our intuition on how markets cope with unfeasible allocations, namely that the sign of
excess demand entirely determines the adjustment irrespectively of the cause of infea-
sibility.13 Thus our approach may offer a better understanding of market mechanisms
than does the traditional one. But the traditional approach is better suited to deal
with topics like withholding of endowments -in our case the state of the world, and thus
endowments, is common knowledge- or tax evasion given the importance of reports in
the renegotiation. Actually our approach can be generalized to deal with these cases by
introducing uncertainty in the renegotiation process or the mechanism as an argument
in the reversion function. These two extensions are easy to write, but require completely
new analytical methods. Thus, they are left for future research.
13 In fact, following the lead of Benassy (1986) many papers dealing with markets from the implemen-
tation point of view disregard the issue of individual feasibility.
24
7. Bibliography
Amorós, P. (2004) ”Nash Implementation and Uncertain Renegotiation” Games and
Economic Behavior, 49, 2, 424-434.
Benassy, J. P. (1986) ”On Competitive Market Mechanisms”. Econometrica, 54, 1,
95-108.
Dagan, N. and R. Serrano (1998) “Invariance and randomness in the Nash pro-
gram for coalitional games” Economics Letters, 58, 43-49.
Dagan, N., Serrano, R. and Volij, O. (1999) “Feasible Implementation of Taxa-
tion Methods”. Review of Economic Design, 4, 57-72.
Hong, L., (1995) “Nash Implementation in Production Economies”. Economic The-
ory, 5, 401-417.
Hong, L., (1996) “Bayesian Implementation in Exchange Economies with State De-
pendent Feasible Sets and Private Information”. Social Choice and Welfare, 13,
433-444.
Hong L., (1998) “Feasible Bayesian Implementation with State Dependent Feasible
Sets.” Journal of Economic Theory 80, 201-221
Hurwicz L., Maskin E. and Postlewaite A., (1995) “Feasible Nash Implementa-
tion of Social Choice Rules when the Designer does not know Endowments or
Production set.” in Ledyard J. (ed) The Economics of Informational Decentral-
ization: Complexity, Efficiency and Stability, Kluwer Academic Publishing.
Jackson, M. and Palfrey, T., (2001) “Voluntary implementation”. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 98, 1-25.
25
Maskin, E. (1999) “Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality”. The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 66, 1, 23 - 38.
Maskin, E. and Moore, J. (1999) “Implementation with Renegotiation”. Review
of Economic Studies, 66, 39-56.
Naeve J., (1999) “Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intu-
itive message spaces” Economics Letters, 62, 23-28.
Piccione, M. and Rubinstein, A. (1993) ”Equilibrium in the Jungle”. Mimeo.
Repullo, R. (1987) “A Simple Proof of Maskin’s theorem on Nash Implementation”.
Social Choice and Welfare, 4, 39-41.
Roemer, J. E. (1996) Theories of Distributive Justice. Harvard University Press.
Serrano R. (1997) “A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implemen-
tation” Economics Letters, 55, 203-208.
Serrano, R. and Vohra, R. (1997) “Non Cooperative Implementation of the Core”.
Social Choice and Welfare, 14, 513-525.
Satterthwaite, M. A. and Sonnenschein, H. (1981) ”Strategy-Proof Allocations
at Differentiable Points”. Review of Economic Studies, 53, 587-597.
Tian, G. (1993) “Implementing Lindahl Allocations by a Withholding Mechanism”.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 22, 163-179
Tian, G., Li, Q. (1995) “On Nash-Implementation in the Presence of Withholding”.
Games and Economic Behavior, 9, 222-233.
26
